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THE FOURTH AMENDMENT IN THE AGE 
OF PERSISTENT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE 
JOHN PAVLETIC* 
 
If Big Brother made movies, persistent aerial surveillance would be its 
masterpiece.  Small airplanes are rigged with high-tech cameras that can 
continuously transmit real-time images to the ground.  The aircraft is able to 
monitor an area of thirty square miles for ten hours at a time.  This 
technology allows video analysts to zoom in and track the location of 
vehicles, and even people.  It was originally designed for military use during 
the Iraq War, but since then, it has been adapted for civilian applications.  In 
2016, the Baltimore Police Department contracted with Persistent 
Surveillance Systems to carry out a trial run of aerial surveillance over the 
city.  The public was not informed that they were being watched every day. 
The Supreme Court has long held that aerial surveillance itself does not 
constitute a search for the purposes of the Fourth Amendment.  The 
persistency of this new kind of reconnaissance changes the calculus.  
Specialized airplanes enable law enforcement agencies to survey sizable 
regions for hours on end.  It is precisely this power that makes persistent 
aerial surveillance more like constant GPS monitoring, which the Court has 
already considered a search.  These modes of long-term observation are 
intrusive and violate a reasonable expectation of privacy. 
Police action must be analyzed over time as a collective sequence of 
steps, not just an individual instance.  The aggregate search can qualify 
under the Fourth Amendment, even if the individual steps did not.  This is 
because prolonged surveillance reveals privacies and intimate details of life 
that short-term surveillance does not.  Repetition, indeed habit, are 
 
* B.A., University of Michigan, 2015; J.D. candidate, Northwestern University Pritzker 
School of Law, 2018.  I would like to thank Professor Tonja Jacobi for her advice and counsel 
in developing this Note.  I am also grateful to the editorial support I have received from my 
brilliant colleagues and friends on the Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology, who are too 
many to name, but include Steph Asplundh, Sam Halter, Palmer Quamme, Emily Halter, and 
Chloe Korban.  Finally, the Republic is forever grateful to James Madison, “the father of the 
Constitution” and the drafter of that pesky Fourth Amendment. 
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cornerstones of personality and identity.  People may reasonably expect 
some form of surveillance. People may also expect those observations to 
remain disconnected and nondescript. 
This technology presents intriguing opportunities for law enforcement 
departments, in the investigation of crime, the presentation of evidence at 
trial, deterrence and crime reduction, exonerating the wrongfully convicted, 
and even traffic management and highway control.  These advantages are 
not enough—and will never be enough—to avoid the command of the 
Constitution.  Over time, the public has become more accepting of the 
surveillance state.  The Constitution remains a counter-majoritarian check 
on the government.  Absent probable cause and a warrant, persistent aerial 
surveillance is an unreasonable search that violates the Fourth Amendment. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Aerial surveillance by police has existed for as long as humans have 
been able to fly, and the Supreme Court has had many occasions to address 
the constitutionality of this type of investigation.1  This Note looks to the 
persistent aerial surveillance being deployed in Baltimore and explores 
whether persistent aerial surveillance is constitutional under the Court’s 
 
1  See generally Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 
(1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
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prevailing Fourth Amendment2 jurisprudence.  The Court has found that 
aerial surveillance is not a search.3  Persistent aerial surveillance, however, is 
a search and therefore must be reasonable to be constitutionally permissible.  
This kind of surveillance differs in both amount and kind from preexisting 
practices.  The emerging technology enables law enforcement to rewind and 
fast-forward video footage of a metropolitan area over the course of a day, 
giving them a look into the private lives and routines of ordinary citizens.4  
Thus, there are significant differences in its capabilities and the resulting 
infringements on privacy rights. 
It is unlikely that the persistent aerial surveillance in Baltimore is 
reasonable because, generally speaking, the Baltimore Police would need to 
have a warrant and probable cause that a crime is being committed before 
any evidence of the crime occurred.5  Indeed, one source indicates that the 
video analysts employed by the Baltimore Police do not always follow people 
or cars based on an inference that they are participating in a criminal act.6  
And they do not look at the footage based on an anonymous tip.7  In short, 
without probable cause and a warrant, the police can search through the 
surveillance footage to spy on the citizens of Baltimore. 
This Note addresses the constitutionality of persistent aerial surveillance 
in two major parts.  The introduction presents the issue of whether this action 
constitutes a search and proposes that the persistence of aerial surveillance 
changes the calculus.  Inevitably, lower courts will soon face this added 
element to the old topic of aerial surveillance.  Part I establishes the factual 
scenario of persistent aerial surveillance in Baltimore.  Part II contends that 
the constancy of persistent aerial surveillance makes this new technology 
more analogous to a GPS monitor than a security camera for Fourth 
 
2  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
3  See, e.g., Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 239.  
4  Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move From Above, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 23, 2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-
secret-surveillance/. 
5  Rachel M. Cohen, How Cops Have Turned Baltimore into a Surveillance State, VICE 
(Sept. 13, 2016), http://www.vice.com/read/psurveillance-baltimore-police-cops-reform 
(explaining that the lack of probable cause is apparent on its face because “while police secrecy 
is nothing new, the kind of dragnet surveillance that Baltimore has engaged in—where officers 
aren’t necessarily looking for one particular person, or conducting a specific investigation—
raises serious political issues.”). 
6  See Jay Stanley, Persistent Aerial Surveillance: Do We Want To Go There, America?, 
ACLU (Feb. 7, 2014, 10:32 AM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/persistent-aerial-surveillance-
do-we-want-go-there-america (“He said their current policy was that they ‘only start from a 
reported crime,’ and that typically analysts working for his company will ‘put everything 
together” overnight, and then present detectives with a detailed incident report.’”). 
7  See id. 
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Amendment purposes.  The Note concludes that absent probable cause and a 
warrant, persistent aerial surveillance is unconstitutional because it violates 
the reasonable expectations of privacy of U.S. citizens, who do not expect 
the government to monitor them across cities for hours at a time. 
I. THE FACTS: PERSISTENT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IN BALTIMORE 
During the Iraq War, if a roadside bomb exploded while a surveillance 
aircraft was in the air, “analysts could zoom in to the exact location of the 
explosion and rewind to the moment of detonation.”8  They could examine 
the footage to see if a vehicle had stopped there earlier to plant the explosive.9  
They could follow that car backwards in time to see where it came from and 
if it stopped at any other locations prior to the bombing location.10  
Additionally, analysts could “fast-forward” from the moment of detonation 
and determine where the driver went after planting the explosive.11 
While use of this technology is accepted in the military, in recent years, 
it has expanded into civilian life, implicating new constitutional concerns.  
One such case is in Baltimore, where the Baltimore Police Department 
(“BPD”) has been conducting a trial run of aerial surveillance over its city 
since January 2016.12  The BPD contracted with Persistent Surveillance 
Systems (“PSS”), the company whose technology the military used in Iraq.13  
PSS adapted the technology from military use to civilian surveillance, and 
the technology is able to monitor an area of thirty square miles.14 
The “elevator pitch” for this technology is: “Google Earth with TiVo 
capability.”15  Small “Cessna” airplanes are equipped with multiple high-
tech, wide-angle cameras that are able to continuously transmit real-time 
images to analysts on the ground.16  These airplanes can fly above the city 
for around ten hours a day.17  The footage they capture is archived and stored 
on hard drives, and police have the capability of retrieving it weeks, or 
months, later.18  The analysts are also ready to assist police in investigations 
 
8  Reel, supra note 4.  
9  Id. 
10  Id. 
11  Id. 
12  Id.  
13  Id. 
14  Id. 
15  Id.  
16  Id. 
17  Id. 
18  Id.  
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as they unfold.19  Currently, the technology does not produce perfect images: 
individual cars can be made out, but not their make or model; pedestrians are 
just pixelated dots, with no way to discern their identity.20  However, a 
timeline for every dot can be established by rewinding and fast-forwarding 
the footage.21 
The public was not informed of this surveillance until August 2016 
when major media outlets, starting with Bloomberg Businessweek, broke the 
story.22  A member of the Maryland House of Delegates stated that this should 
have been a multilateral decision and that the public has a right to know 
where, when, and how the surveillance is used.23  The American Civil 
Liberties Union (“ACLU”) of Maryland also jumped into action, planning 
legislation that would stop the BPD from adopting new technology without 
input from the public.24  ACLU attorney David Roch said, “These tools 
should not be acquired and deployed in secret . . . We are not a foreign enemy; 
this is not a battlefield.  Secrecy simply has no place whatsoever in this entire 
discussion.”25 
Persistent aerial surveillance, unthinkable two decades ago, is emerging 
as the technology of tomorrow.  The technology has evolved from the 
military context to commercial use.26  In 2006, the Pentagon was in search of 
technology that would detect who was planting the roadside bombs that were 
killing American soldiers in Iraq.27  As a result, Angel Fire was born: a wide-
area, live-feed surveillance system that could scan an entire city.28  Back in 
2006, the system utilized an assembly of four to six commercially-available 
industrial imaging cameras.29  The cameras were positioned at different 
angles on the bottom of a plane and synchronized to produce a “searchable, 
constantly updating photographic map.”30 
The cameras had limits to their abilities then, as they do now.  For 
 
19  Id. 
20  Id. 
21  Id. 
22  Id. 
23  Kevin Rector & Ian Duncan, State lawmakers, ACLU Consider Legislation to Regulate 
Police Surveillance, THE BALTIMORE SUN (Sept. 3, 2016, 3:00 pm), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/politics/bs-md-police-surveillance-legislation-
20160903-story.html. 
24  Id. 
25  Id. 
26  Reel, supra note 4. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id.  
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instance, the analysts could not tell an American soldier apart from an Iraqi 
civilian.31  But the point was not to recognize individual perpetrators; instead, 
it was to follow any car or person backward or forward in time.32  In 2007, 
the system was deployed in Fallujah and other important battlegrounds.33  It 
was eventually upgraded to include weatherproof equipment and night 
vision.34  Later, it was transformed into Blue Devil, which attached narrow-
focus zoom lenses to the original wide-area cameras.35  The technology has 
since been developed for commercial use; the number of cameras has been 
increased to twelve, and the assembly has been designed to be lighter and 
cheaper.36 
Since the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, the United States has 
seen a significant investment in video surveillance.37  Both law enforcement 
and private businesses have invested in security camera systems.38  There is 
some debate about whether the mere presence of cameras reduces crime 
rates.39  But the fact remains: a majority of the American public supports their 
deployment.40  In November 2015, a Washington Post poll found that of those 
surveyed, 14% wanted fewer cameras in public.41  In fact, 41% of 
respondents wanted more cameras.42 
But persistent aerial surveillance differs from other forms of aerial 
surveillance because of its ability to monitor vast areas for long periods of 
time.  This obliterates the idea that a person’s comings and goings are no 
one’s business but their own.  So, although this capability may be 
advantageous from a law enforcement vantage point, it raises significant 
Fourth Amendment concerns.  The Supreme Court has addressed the issue of 
aerial surveillance on a number of occasions, and thus far, it has consistently 
 
31  Id.  
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Id. 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Craig Timberg, New Surveillance Technology Can Track Everyone in an Area for 




38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Government and Corporate Surveillance Draw Wide Concern, WASH. Post. (Dec. 22, 
2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/page/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2013/12/21/ 
National-Politics/Polling/release_282.xml?tid=a_inl.  
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concluded that it is not a search.43  But those types of aerial surveillance did 
not have the spatial and temporal capabilities that PSS does.  Furthermore, 
these capabilities are the elements that make PSS more intrusive in violating 
a person’s expectation of privacy. 
II. PERSISTENT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IS AKIN TO GPS MONITORING 
AND CONSTITUTES A SEARCH 
A person’s reasonable expectation of privacy is determined by 
analyzing their individual expectation and what society acknowledges as 
reasonable.44  The Court has applied this test to aerial surveillance cases 
before; however, persistent aerial surveillance is unlike any previous form 
evaluated.  Instead, persistent aerial surveillance is more similar to the GPS-
monitoring cases the Court has considered.  The mosaic theory supports this 
argument because this activity should be analyzed collectively.45  To be sure, 
persistent aerial surveillance presents many advantages to law enforcement.  
But potential technological benefits for law enforcement are never enough to 
evade the reach of the Constitution. 
A. THE KATZ DOCTRINE INDICATES THAT THE MANNER OF THE 
SURVEILLANCE DOES NOT NECESSARILY DICTATE WHETHER A 
SEARCH OCCURRED 
The Court crafted the legal test for what conduct constitutes a search 
under the Fourth Amendment in Katz v. United States.46  This test replaced 
the trespass doctrine and shifted the focus away from the means of searching 
to the perspective of the person being searched.47  The Court held that, 
regardless of location, a conversation is protected from unreasonable search 
and seizure if it is made with a “reasonable expectation of privacy.”48  The 
two-prong test, originally set out by Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion, 
is (1) whether the individual has “exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation 
of privacy” and (2) whether “the expectation be one that society is prepared 
to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”49 
Determining reasonable expectation of privacy requires an analysis into 
what the individual expects and what society deems is reasonable to expect.  
 
43  See generally Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 
207 (1986); Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986). 
44  See id.  
45  See infra Section D. 
46  389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).  
47  Id. at 353. 
48  Id. at 360–61. 
49  Id. at 361.  
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At first glance, one might think that individuals take active steps every day 
to avoid nosey neighbors, curious police officers, or chatty coworkers.  On 
the other hand, as public opinion regarding security cameras shows, many 
Americans are content with sacrificing their personal liberty in public spaces 
to maintain a greater security interest.50  It is a hard balance to strike.51  But 
these same Americans are not equally satisfied with allowing their 
government to monitor their every move.52 
As of now, persistent surveillance can track individuals traveling from 
Point A to Point B to Point C.  While many might not consider this to be 
invasive, it is unclear what happens when the technology develops to the 
point where it can make out particular details about cars and people.53  
Nobody knows what happens when the police are able to spy on people 
within the confines of their own homes or workplaces.  If you pair 
sophisticated telephoto lenses with infrared technology, these notions do not 
seem that far-fetched.  Even though these may be interesting hypotheticals to 
ponder, the Court has “never held that potential, as opposed to actual, 
invasions of privacy constitute searches for purposes of the Fourth 
Amendment.”54  At the same time, Justice Scalia took the “long view” in 
Kyllo and—writing for the Court—stated that “the rule we adopt must take 
account of more sophisticated systems that are already in use or in 
development.”55 
In response to concerns about “big brother,” PSS analysts explain they 
only zoom in on the photographic map in response to a police request, either 
during a rapidly unfolding situation like a homicide or violent assault, or to 
assist in an investigation of a burglary or hit-and-run from a day earlier.56  
But that statement necessarily means that the surveillance staff is monitoring 
 
50  See Timberg, supra note 37. 
51  See generally Cohen, supra note 5 (“You need to balance some legitimate police needs 
with the idea that police may just have too much information on innocent people . . .  .  Police 
can go as far as they want, but what do communities want?”) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
52  See Stanley, supra note 6 (opining that persistent aerial surveillance “does exactly what 
everyone has feared drones would do,” and “drones have provoked huge opposition and 
concern across the country”). 
53  Matthew Feeney, Beware Police Drones, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 1, 2016, 4:15 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/beware-police-drones_us_58408b08e4b09e21702 
da54f (“Military drone surveillance technology currently exists that allows users to see six-
inch details in an area the size of a small city.  While presently too expensive for many law 
enforcement agencies, we shouldn’t be in any doubt that when this technology is affordable 
police would seize on the opportunity to put it to use.”). 
54  United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 712 (1984).  
55  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 36 (2001).  
56  Reel, supra note 4. 
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the live feed, at times, not only without a warrant, but also without probable 
cause.  An exception for exigent circumstances may be applicable in some 
situations, but most exigencies would fall under the scenarios previously 
described. 
To ease anxieties, PSS also claims that every action that its support staff 
takes is “logged and saved” in the system.57  Because analysts are capable 
of—and do in fact—zoom in and search through these photographic maps, 
this still represents the kind of unbridled discretion seen in the era of general 
warrants.58  Storing pictures of people’s backyards, decks, porches, and 
garages—even temporarily—is problematic.  These practices do not make a 
difference in the analysis under Katz.59  Under the Court’s current 
jurisprudence and the common law, society has recognized objectively 
reasonable expectations of privacy in their home and curtilage and in the 
location tracking of their vehicle.60  It should not make a difference in the 
constitutional analysis that law enforcement departments, and their agents, 
can be held accountable for their behavior post hoc.  This does not cure an 
ongoing constitutional violation.  For example, just because the body camera 
on a police officer captures his excessive use of force on a civilian,61 that does 
not make his prior actions any more constitutional.  There is just better 
evidence of it now.  The question is: does the conduct of the officer violate 
the Constitution?  A record is not a remedy in and of itself. 
B. PERSISTENT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IS NOT LIKE THE AERIAL 
SURVEILLANCE THAT THE COURT HAS PREVIOUSLY CONSIDERED 
The Court has consistently held that the Fourth Amendment does not 
protect open fields.62  Of course, an exception to this rule has been carved out 
for the area immediately surrounding a home, referred to as the “curtilage.”63  
Open fields, then, consist of those portions of a homeowner’s property that 
 
57  Id. For instance, keystrokes and addresses that are zoomed in on are registered and 
retained. Id. 
58  See generally Lo-Ji Sales, Inc. v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979). 
59  Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).  
60  See generally id. at 347; United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400 (2012); United States v. 
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987).  
61  See generally Matthew Feeney, Using Persistent Surveillance to Watch the Watchmen, 
CATO INST. (Sept. 20, 2016, 2:35 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/using-persistent-
surveillance-watch-watchmen (discussing the positive effect body cameras can have with the 
right policies in place). 
62  See Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170, 173 (1984) (citing to Hester v. United States, 
265 U.S. 57 (1924)). 
63  See Dunn, 480 U.S. at 296.  
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extend beyond the house and curtilage.64  Beyond that, the Court has 
maintained that society has recognized no objectively reasonable expectation 
of privacy in open fields.65  This is true of a pre- and post-Katz world.  For 
instance, in Oliver, police officers were investigating a tip that the defendant 
was growing marijuana on his property.66  They drove onto his land, past his 
house, and up to a gate which displayed a “[n]o trespassing” sign.67  The 
officers exited their vehicle and walked along a path around the gate into his 
property for about a mile, until they spotted a large marijuana plant on the 
property.68  Relying on the open fields doctrine, the Court held that the 
officers’ actions did not constitute a search under the Fourth Amendment.69 
Specifically, the Court reasoned that both “the public and police lawfully may 
survey lands from the air.”70  This was one of the overriding justifications for 
the rule, and it necessitates the constitutionality of aerial surveillance.  If 
police can infiltrate open fields on the ground, then surely they can surveil 
them from the air.71 
Furthermore, the Court has reiterated that it will not require law 
enforcement to remain in the Stone Age.72  This means that police are 
permitted to substitute aerial surveillance when the same action would be 
perfectly lawful on the ground.73  The third-party doctrine presupposes that 
if an individual knowingly exposes something to the public, they forego their 
privacy interest in this data.74  Therefore, the public nature of these acts 
supports this form of technological monitoring.  This is essentially what the 
Court decided in Dow Chemical Co., when government inspectors did not 
obtain a warrant before conducting aerial surveillance of outdoor business 
facilities.75  The Court analogized the open areas of an industrial complex to 
 
64  Id. at 300. 
65  See Katz, 389 U.S. at 347. 
66  Oliver, 466 U.S. at 173. 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 181. 
70  Id. at 179. 
71  Dow Chem. Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 250–51 (1986) (“Open fields, as we 
held in Oliver, are places in which people do not enjoy reasonable expectations of privacy and 
therefore are open to warrantless inspections from ground and air alike.”) (citing Oliver, 466 
U.S. at 180–81). 
72  See, e.g., United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276, 282–84 (1983) (“Nothing in the Fourth 
Amendment prohibited the police from augmenting the sensory faculties bestowed upon them 
at birth with such enhancement as science and technology afforded them in this case.”). 
73  See Dow Chemical Co., 476 U.S. at 250–51. 
74  See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 744–45 (1979) (explaining the third-party 
doctrine). 
75  Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 229. 
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open fields, and thus held that there was no objectively reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the area.76 
On top of the open fields analysis, the Court also addressed the use of 
powerful, expensive photographic technology from the sky above.77  The 
majority and dissent disputed the actual sophistication of the technology, but 
importantly, both found it relevant.78  The majority characterized the 
photographs as those used in “mapmaking,” and wrote that “[a]ny person 
with an airplane and an aerial camera could readily duplicate them.”79  But 
the dissent suggested that the camera had the “capability to reveal minute 
details of Dow’s confidential technology and equipment.”80  The dissent also 
stated that civilians are not “likely to purchase $22,000 cameras,”81 which in 
the dissent’s view, necessarily affected whether society recognized that 
expectation of privacy as objectively reasonable. 
Indeed, in that case, the Government conceded “that surveillance of 
private property by using highly sophisticated surveillance equipment not 
generally available to the public, such as satellite technology, might be 
constitutionally proscribed absent a warrant.”82  Even if the pictures reveal 
more than the naked-eye, what’s important is whether “intimate details” are 
revealed.83  In Dow Chemical Co., the observation was limited to “an outline 
of the facility’s buildings and equipment.”84 
The dissent additionally asserted that “Katz measures Fourth 
Amendment rights by reference to the privacy interests that a free society 
recognizes as reasonable, not by reference to the method of surveillance used 
in the particular case.”85  Just because the world becomes more technological 
and civilians have access to incredible tools, does not make it any more 
constitutional for the government to use those devices against them.  These 
wide range cameras—when used for long periods of time—are likely exactly 
what the Court alluded to in Dow Chemical Co.  The technology has the 
 
76  Id. at 239. 
77  Id. at 238. 
78  Id. at 238, 251, 251 n.13. 
79  Id. at 231. 
80  Id. at 251 n.13. 
81  Id. at 251 n.13. 
82  Id. at 238. 
83  Id.; see also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 37 (2001) (“Dow Chemical, however, 
involved enhanced aerial photography of an industrial complex, which does not share the 
Fourth Amendment sanctity of the home . . . In the home, our cases show, all details are 
intimate details, because the entire area is held safe from prying government eyes.”) (emphasis 
in original). 
84  Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 238. 
85  Id. at 251. 
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ability to track you at all times within your community, meaning it has the 
potential to trace the very intimate details of your life. 
As previously mentioned, the Court has addressed the issue of aerial 
surveillance in the context of the Fourth Amendment a number of times and 
has held that aerial observation is not considered a search under the 
Constitution.86  Take California v. Ciraolo, where the defendant grew 
marijuana plants in his backyard, enclosed from view by fencing.87  Acting 
on an anonymous tip, the police department sent officers in a private plane 
over the property to photograph it at an altitude of 1,000 feet.88  Based on the 
naked eye observations of an officer, a search warrant was granted to enter 
the rest of the property on foot.89 
The Court held that what is exposed, and then observed, by the naked 
eye is not a search.90  The Court reasoned that the officers investigated from 
a legal, public vantage point that was physically nonintrusive.91  However, 
the dissent did point out that “[r]eliance on the manner of surveillance is 
directly contrary to the standard of Katz.”92  As a result, the manner in which 
one obtains the vantage point is not hugely significant.  The fact that planes 
are taking pictures should not cabin this new technology into the Court’s pre-
existing interpretation of aerial surveillance.  The correct question is 
“whether society is prepared to recognize an asserted privacy interest as 
reasonable.”93 
Also instructive is Florida v. Riley.94  In that case, the sheriff’s office 
received a tip that the defendant was growing marijuana on his rural 
property.95  Law enforcement surveilled the property using a helicopter, and 
with their naked eyes, they were able to see marijuana growing through a gap 
in the roofing of a greenhouse.96  The Court held that these observations were 
not a search.97  The Court explained that a private citizen could have legally 
flown in the same airspace, recognizing that they were not crafting a per se 
 
86  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989); California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 207 
(1986); Dow Chem. Co., 476 U.S. at 227. 
87  Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 209. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 215. 
91  Id. at 213. 
92  Id. at 223 (emphasis omitted).  
93  Id. at 223. 
94  488 U.S. 445, 445 (1989). 
95  Id. at 448. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. at 452. 
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rule on all aerial surveillance.98  In addition, the helicopter did not interfere 
with the normal use of the property and did not intrude into the more intimate 
areas of the home and curtilage.99  In a persuasive concurrence, Justice 
O’Connor opined that the frequency of public flight in the particular air space 
is a necessary concern in the analysis.100  Further, the mere legality of such 
flights is insufficient for reasonable expectation of privacy purposes.101 
Persistent aerial surveillance is unlike what the Court has previously 
contemplated in cases like Ciraolo and Riley.102  In the past, the Court has 
expressed no concern when a civilian had the capability of observing the 
criminal activity with a passing glance.103  But this is no passing glance. On 
the one hand, it is true that the PSS cameras do not currently possess the 
capability of recognizing individuals, and of course, there are plenty of 
security cameras on the ground that can do this.104  Like that equipment, aerial 
surveillance could potentially pose no problem under the Fourth 
Amendment.105  But the difference is in the ability to incessantly monitor a 
person throughout their day.  Again, the manner in which law enforcement 
chooses to surveil has lost constitutional relevancy over time.106  The real 
question is: whether society is—or is not—prepared to recognize a privacy 
to travel without being tracked as reasonable.107 
In Riley, the Court necessarily implied that if private citizens cannot fly 
in the same airspace as law enforcement, then that may pose a constitutional 
 
98  Id. at 451 (“This is not to say that an inspection of the curtilage of a house from an 
aircraft will always pass muster under the Fourth Amendment simply because the plane is 
within the navigable airspace specified by law.”). 
99  Id. at 452. 
100  Id. at 454–55. 
101  Id. 
102  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 209 (1986); Riley, 488 U.S. at 445. 
103  Id. 
104  On the ground, security cameras are visible, and the public has notice of their presence.  
Additionally, there is a difference between one camera taping you doing something one time, 
and the government having a record of you every time you walk out of your home. 
105  But see Jon Schuppe, New Baltimore Aerial Surveillance Program Raises Trust Issues, 
NBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2016, 9:33 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/new-
baltimore-aerial-surveillance-program-raises-trust-issues-n638496 (“The images are not 
sharp enough to make out details, but they have been used to link with street-level 
surveillance cameras to identify suspects, Baltimore officials say.”). 
106  See Ciraolo, 476 U.S. at 223 (Powell, J., dissenting) (“Reliance on the manner of 
surveillance is directly contrary to the standard of Katz, which identifies a constitutionally 
protected privacy right by focusing on the interests of the individual and of a free society.”) 
(emphasis in original). 
107  See Monte Reel, Police Spy Tools Evolve Faster Than Lawmakers Can Keep Up: 
Baltimore’s Aerial Surveillance Continues Unchecked, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Dec. 8, 
2016), https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-baltimore-surveillance-project/. 
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issue.108  Now, of course, many civilians are pilots who operate their own 
aircrafts and share the same sky with commercial and governmental planes.  
And private aircrafts are in fact able to circle the same thirty-mile radius for 
ten hours straight in order to take pictures of their city, or for that matter, any 
other purpose.109  But as Justice O’Connor noted in her concurrence, the 
general public does not partake in such activity.110  And just because the 
observation flights may be legal does not change the fact that society does 
not expect them to occur.111  Although the cameras used by PSS may be 
commercially available, that does not mean they are in public use.  As the 
photographic lenses continue to grow in power, the privacy costs will rise.112  
PSS analysts say that they will widen their viewing area, as opposed to 
increasing the magnification of the cameras.113  But if the Constitution does 
not offer protection, then people will be left to “the mercy of advancing 
technology—including imaging technology that could discern all human 
activity in the home.”114 
C. PERSISTENT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE IS LIKE GPS MONITORING 
In regard to the Fourth Amendment, persistent aerial surveillance is 
similar to Global Positioning System (“GPS”) monitoring because both 
surveillance devices allow law enforcement to monitor the movements of 
cars (and persons) as they transcend through the public and private spheres 
of their lives.  To illustrate, in United States v. Jones, a GPS device was 
installed on Jones’s automobile without a valid warrant.115  The device 
tracked the vehicle’s movements twenty-four hours a day over the course of 
a month.116  The Court held that this police action did constitute a search, but 
the justices were split as to whether it did so under a common law trespassory 
 
108  See Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 451 (1989). 
109  See Kevin Rector, As police weigh surveillance program, private company at helm 
looks to court private clients, BALT. SUN, (Oct. 7, 2016, 6:56 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/baltimore-city/bs-md-ci-surveillance-
alternatives-20161007-story.html (“The FAA does not regulate the length of time that an 
aircraft can overfly an area or the purpose of a flight, the agency said in a statement.”) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
110  Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 455 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
111  Id. at 454–55. 
112  See Reel, supra note 107 (“It is inevitable that if this is allowed to happen, the cameras 
will be put on drones . . . And it is absolutely inevitable that the camera resolution is only 
going to be going up, the cost of the cameras will be going down, and what the cameras will 
see will only become more detailed.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
113  Reel, supra note 4.  
114  Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 35–36 (2001). 
115  565 U.S. 400, 402–03 (2012).  
116  Id.  
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test or the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test.117  Justice Alito 
concurred in the opinion, stating that although short-term monitoring may be 
constitutionally permissible, “the use of longer term GPS monitoring in 
investigations of most offenses impinges on expectations of privacy.”118  For 
Justice Alito, the distinguishing factor of this method of surveillance was the 
duration, which was significant because of what that revealed about an 
individual’s routine.119  GPS monitoring gives context to surveillance that is 
otherwise missing from most investigations. 
Justice Sotomayor also concurred in the opinion, and she argued that 
GPS surveillance in general reveals completely private destinations, like 
“trips to the psychiatrist, the plastic surgeon, the abortion clinic, the AIDS 
treatment center, the strip club, the criminal defense attorney, the by-the-hour 
motel, the union meeting, the mosque, synagogue or church, the gay bar and 
on and on.”120  Justice Alito also made clear that, at least in his mind, the 
Court’s prior decision in Knotts was distinguishable because there, the 
monitoring of every movement was not for twenty-four hours.121  The police 
discretely used the device over a matter of hours.122  In fact, the Knotts Court 
specifically contemplated the fact that different principles might apply to 
constant tracking of a day or more.123 
In Jones, the concurring justices refused to draw a line on how long it 
would take to transform the event of following a car home into a wild-goose 
chase into the private lives of ordinary Americans.124  Persistent aerial 
surveillance falls somewhere in this grey area.  Currently, the planes that 
carry the cameras can fly above a city for around ten hours.125  The temporal 
limitations the Constitution places on the surveillance are unclear at best.  
Eventually, this turns into a proverbial chip being implanted into United 
States citizens.  And the effect this could have on a free and open society is 
frightening.  As Justice Sotomayor stated in Jones: “[a]wareness that the 
government may be watching chills associational and expressive 
freedoms.”126  People will be less likely to go their place of worship, their 
 
117  Id. at 404–11. 
118  See id. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring). 
119  Id. 
120  Id. at 415 (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (internal citation omitted); see also Rector & 
Duncan, supra note 23. 
121  See Jones, 565 U.S. at 430 (Alito, J., concurring); United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 
276, 279, 283 (1983). 
122  Id. at 284. 
123  Id. 
124  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012). 
125  See Reel, supra note 4.  
126  Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring); see Cohen, supra note 5. 
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healthcare provider, the casino, or the bar.  The citizens of Baltimore may be 
too scared to leave their city, even their own homes. 
Expanding on GPS monitoring, some companies store the photographic 
data they collect.127  Raw footage of the photographic map is accessible on a 
hard drive.128  This capacity presents interesting arguments that could favor 
the use of the technology.  For example, police behavior and state action 
could be monitored and reviewed.129  Squad cars and officers on foot could 
be tracked throughout the city.  From this data, it could readily be discerned 
in what areas and neighborhoods officers spend most of their time, and how 
they respond to events as they transpire.  This oversight would not only 
promote police efficiency but also accountability because it could ferret out 
law enforcement overreach and other abuses of power.  Additionally, 
defendants could have access to the surveillance footage.130  In some cases, 
these pictures could exonerate an accused by supporting an alibi that he was 
not at the crime scene when the fatal events took place.  While these are 
obviously appealing possibilities, it does not alter the constitutional analysis 
of whether society recognizes an expectation of privacy as objectively 
reasonable.  Furthermore, requiring the police to get a warrant to deploy the 
surveillance system does nothing to prevent the positive side effects laid out 
above from coming about.  Moreover, getting a warrant today is not the chore 
or tax on resources that it used to be.131 
The five-justice majority opinion in Jones was based on the common 
law physical trespass test.132  Because the installation of the monitoring 
device intruded onto the suspect’s property, it was a warrantless search in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.133  But the majority never reached the 
 
127  See Kevin Rector, Retention of Baltimore police surveillance footage breaks with 
company’s standard 45-day policy, BALT. SUN (Oct. 29, 2016, 2:30 PM), 
http://www.baltimoresun.com/news/maryland/investigations/bs-md-sun-investigates-
surveillance-retention-20161029-story.html (“The retention policy is one of the critical 
questions with regard to any surveillance program because the longer data is retained, the 
greater the opportunities for misuse and for repurposing of the data into new uses that can 
harm people in new and expanded ways.”) (internal quotation omitted). 
128  See id. 
129  See, e.g., Reel, supra note 4. 
130  See id. 
131  See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (“Recent technological advances 
similar to those discussed here have, in addition, made the process of obtaining a warrant itself 
more efficient.”) (citing to Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1573 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (noting that, for example, in one jurisdiction, “police 
officers can e-mail warrant requests to judges’ iPads [and] judges have signed such warrants 
and e-mailed them back to officers in less than 15 minutes.”)). 
132  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 410–11 (2012). 
133  Id. at 407.  
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question of whether long-term, continuous surveillance would infringe upon 
an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.134 
D. THE MOSAIC THEORY SUPPORTS THIS CLASSIFICATION OF 
PERSISTENT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE AS GPS MONITORING 
At this point, it might be helpful to zoom out a bit.  Indeed, to properly 
understand the significance of the Jones opinion, one must start where the 
Justices did: contemplating the new legal theory the D.C. Circuit adopted in 
United States v. Maynard.135  The concurrences in the Supreme Court’s  
Jones decision demonstrate that five justices were persuaded by the “mosaic 
theory,” a new way of cognizing the Fourth Amendment.136  A commentator 
has discussed how the D.C. Circuit laid out their approach to searches in 
Maynard, explaining that they  
can be analyzed as a collective sequence of steps rather than as individual steps.  
Identifying Fourth Amendment searches requires analyzing police actions over time as 
a collective ‘mosaic’ of surveillance; the mosaic can count as a collective Fourth 
Amendment search even though the individual steps taken in isolation do not.137 
The D.C. Circuit was analyzing the set of facts present in Jones that had 
to do with the persistent GPS monitoring of a vehicle.138  The key issue is 
whether or not the circumstances have changed concerning what constitutes 
a search.  Like many of life’s looming questions, the answer was that time 
makes all the difference in the world: 
Prolonged surveillance reveals types of information not revealed by short-term 
surveillance, such as what a person does repeatedly, what he does not do, and what he 
does ensemble.  These types of information can each reveal more about a person than 
does any individual trip viewed in isolation.  Repeated visits to a church, a gym, a bar, 
or a bookie tell a story not told by any single visit, as does one’s not visiting any of 
these places over the course of a month.  The sequence of a person’s movements can 
reveal still more; a single trip to a gynecologist’s office tells little about a woman, but 
that trip followed a few weeks later by a visit to a baby supply store tells a different 
story.  A person who knows all of another person’s travels can deduce whether he is a 
weekly church goer, a heavy drinker, a regular at the gym, an unfaithful husband, an 
outpatient receiving medical treatment, an associate of particular individuals or political 
 
134  See id. 
135  615 F.3d 544 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  
136  Jones, 565 U.S. at 409–19; see also Maynard, 615 F.3d at 561–62. 
137  Orin S. Kerr, The Mosaic Theory of the Fourth Amendment, 111 MICH. L. REV. 311, 
313 (2012); see also Steven M. Bellovin et al., When Enough Is Enough: Location Tracking, 
Mosaic Theory, and Machine Learning, 8 NYU J. L. & LIBERTY 556, 557 (2014). 
138  Maynard, 615 F.3d at 544.  
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groups—and not just one such fact about a person, but all such facts.139 
This line of reasoning is what Justice Sotomayor picked up on when she 
spoke of the chilling effect that this type of surveillance could have on 
“associational and expressive freedoms.”140  Indeed, the fear is that people 
will be less likely to go certain places knowing that the government is 
watching.  The Constitution prevents this outcome. 
In Maynard, the D.C. Circuit held that society was prepared to recognize 
this privacy interest as reasonable.141  They explained that “[a] reasonable 
person does not expect anyone to monitor and retain a record of every time 
he drives his car, including his origin, route, destination, and each place he 
stops and how long he stays there; rather, he expects each of those 
movements to remain disconnected and anonymous.”142  It is no answer that 
different First Amendment concerns are at play with movements and video 
recording than there are with speech.  Maynard, standing in agreement with 
other cases, has explicitly recognized that this form of monitoring exposes 
those things people expect to be private.143  Additionally, the fact that an 
individual might traverse between traditionally private and public spaces, 
while relevant, is not dispositive on the analysis, because “[a] person does 
not leave his privacy behind when he walks out his front door . . . .”144 
The concerns that the D.C. Circuit raised are not new to the bench.  Since 
Smith v. Maryland, courts have been fearful of this idea of persistency in 
searching and the potential privacies it may reveal.145  Furthermore, in the 
years both prior to and after the D.C. Circuit’s exposé on the theory (and the 
Supreme Court’s subsequent ruling in the case which left this particular issue 
for another day), several district courts and circuit courts have passed 
favorably on the matter. 
In United States v. Cuevas-Sanchez, the Fifth Circuit said, in dicta, that 
the installment of a video surveillance camera on a power pole to monitor 
activities taking place in an individual’s backyard constituted a search.146  In 
order to reach this conclusion, the court had to distinguish this case from 
 
139  Id. at 562.  
140  Jones, 565 U.S. at 416 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
141  See Maynard, 615 F.3d at 563. 
142  Id. (internal citations and quotations omitted). 
143  See id.  
144  Id.  
145  See 442 U.S. 735, 748 (1979) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“This is not because such a list 
might in some sense be incriminating, but because it easily could reveal the identities of the 
persons and the places called, and thus reveal the most intimate details of a person’s life.”); 
see also id. at 751 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
146  821 F.2d 248, 251 (5th Cir. 1987).  
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other aerial surveillance cases and the Ciraolo rule.147  In that case, the 
Supreme Court held that taking photographs from a plane flying 1,000 feet 
above the property was not a search.148  But in Cuevas-Sanchez, the Fifth 
Circuit described a very different situation because of the constancy of the 
monitoring: 
This type of surveillance provokes an immediate negative visceral reaction: 
indiscriminate video surveillance raises the spectre of the Orwellian state.  Here, unlike 
in Ciraolo, the government’s intrusion is not minimal.  It is not a one-time overhead 
flight or a glance over the fence by a passer-by.  Here the government placed a video 
camera that allowed them to record all activity in Cuevas’s backyard.  It does not follow 
that Ciraolo authorizes any type of surveillance whatever just because one type of 
minimally-intrusive aerial observation is possible.149 
So, although the defendant might have had no expectation to be free from a 
nosey neighbor or passerby, he did have an expectation that someone (or 
something) would not always have eyes on him.150 
The Ninth Circuit has also addressed persistent video surveillance.  In 
United States v. Nerber, the court analyzed whether a video camera hidden 
in a hotel room was a search.151  Expounding on the issue, the court said: 
Hidden video surveillance is one of the most intrusive investigative mechanisms 
available to law enforcement.  The sweeping, indiscriminate manner in which video 
surveillance can intrude upon us, regardless of where we are, dictates that its use be 
approved only in limited circumstances.  As we pointed out in Taketa, the defendant 
had a reasonable expectation to be free from hidden video surveillance because the 
video search was directed straight at him, rather than being a search of property he did 
not own or control False and the silent, unblinking lens of the camera was intrusive in 
a way that no temporary search of the office could have been.152 
In this case, the court makes clear that the practice of singling out an 
individual and specifically targeting them, much like being able to zoom in 
on a moving vehicle or person using persistent aerial surveillance, is 
especially intrusive.153  The court reasons this is primarily because it is not 
limited in scope, whether it be temporally (as in this case), spatially, or, as 
with persistent aerial surveillance, both.154 
The Sixth Circuit has not had occasion to reach a holding on the issue’ 
 
147  Id.  
148  California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 215 (1986).   
149  Cuevas-Sanchez, 821 F.2d at 251. 
150  See id. 
151  222 F.3d 597, 605–06 (9th Cir. 2000). 
152  Id. at 603 (internal citation omitted). 
153  See id. 
154  See id. 
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however, the circuit has taken the opportunity to discuss it in one of its more 
recent opinions.155  Of note, the court took the time to distinguish Ciraolo 
much like its sister circuits have, indicating the main differentiating factor 
was the brief flyover there, as compared to the extended and constant 
surveillance in Anderson-Bagshaw.156  And even though the court held that 
any constitutional violation would have been harmless, they still paused to 
state: 
Nonetheless, we confess some misgivings about a rule that would allow the government 
to conduct long-term video surveillance of a person’s backyard without a warrant.  Few 
people, it seems, would expect that the government can constantly film their backyard 
for over three weeks using a secret camera that can pan and zoom and stream a live 
image to government agents.157 
Lastly, the court concluded by making the common observation that at least 
five justices of the Supreme Court share their concerns regarding long-term 
surveillance.158 
Long-term tracking can also be carried out using cell phone location 
information (“CSLI”).159  The Fourth Circuit has used the justifications of the 
mosaic theory to hold that the warrantless use of such technology was in 
violation of the Fourth Amendment.160  Interestingly, the court discussed at 
length two variables that are highly relevant to surveillance cases: quantity 
and quality.161  As discussed supra in Section I, persistent aerial surveillance 
currently remains relatively limited in its capabilities.162  It can monitor a 
pixelated dot; however, it is just a dot on the screen.163  The analysts are 
unable to determine the make or model of a vehicle, or the race or sex of a 
 
155  United States v. Anderson-Bagshaw, 509 F. App’x 396, 405 (6th Cir. 2012). 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. 
159  See United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421, 447–48 (4th Cir. 2016). The case law in 
this area is in flux, as demonstrated by the Supreme Court’s recent decision to grant certiorari 
in Carpenter v. United States, 819 F.3d 880 (6th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, 137 S. Ct. 2211 
(2017); see also Orin Kerr, Third Party Rights and the Carpenter Cell-Site Case, WASH. POST: 
THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (June 15, 2017) https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2017/06/15/third-party-rights-and-the-carpenter-cell-site-
case/?utm_term=.11adbe595307; Orin Kerr, United States v. Wallace is a GPS Case, Not a 
Cell-Site Case — Here’s Why It Matters, WASH. POST: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (May 24, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/05/24/united-
states-v-wallace-is-a-gps-case-not-a-cell-site-case-heres-why-it-
matters/?utm_term=.c6cc53f7adaa (distinguishing GPS cases and cell-site cases). 
160  Graham, 824 F.3d at 447–48. 
161  Id. at 447.  
162  See supra Section I. 
163  Reel, supra note 4.  
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person.164  But what they are able to do is follow an individual for at least ten 
hours a day over a thirty-mile radius.165  And because the data is stored, 
analysts can stitch these photographic maps together over a long period of 
time.166  This is not unlike the CSLI the Fourth Circuit addressed in Graham.  
And as a result, it is clear that at least one circuit is willing to consider, and 
potentially weigh more heavily, the factor of quantity.167   
The mosaic theory has also been considered at trial.168  In a decision 
coming out of the Eastern District of Michigan, the judge considered 
persistent surveillance in a drug trafficking case.169  The court held that the 
investigatory technique violated the individual’s reasonable expectation of 
privacy.170  The judge reasoned that “[t]he blanket surveillance of an 
individual for thirty days at a time cannot equate to a brief detention, 
however.  The ‘nature and quality’ of an intrusion of that magnitude (in 
excess of the “4-week mark”) tips the balance in favor of the 
individual . . . .”171 
In United States v. Vargas, the Eastern District of Washington 
confronted the common pole camera situation.172  The surveillance was 
continuous, and it recorded activity in the defendant’s front yard for more 
than six weeks.173  Additionally, the camera was equipped with “zooming and 
panning capabilities,” much like the technology used in persistent aerial 
surveillance.174  The court distinguished the facts from other decisions it cited 
to where the evidence was not suppressed.175  It made clear that the front yard 
was “not a public or urban setting,” and that a continuous recording of the 
defendant’s front yard for a six-week period violated his reasonable 
expectation of privacy.176  The court relied on an established contrast with 
 
164  Id. 
165  Id. 
166  Id. 
167  United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 447, 447–48 (4th Cir. 2016).  
168  See United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. CR 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537 at 
*4–5, 8 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2015); United States v. Vargas, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672 at 
*1–2, 12–13 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014); United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 622–24 
(E.D. Mich. 2014); United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855, 870 (E.D. Tenn. 2013); 
Shafer v. City of Boulder, 896 F. Supp. 2d 915, 930–32 (D. Nev. 2012). 
169  White, 62 F. Supp. 3d at 624.  
170  Id. 
171  Id. 
172  Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 1–2, 12–13, Vargas, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 184672, ECF No. 106. 
173  Id. at 1. 
174  Id. at 13. 
175  Id. at 25–27. 
176  Id. at 26. 
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Ciraolo and also cited to a District of Nevada decision for support.177  In 
Shafer v. City of Boulder, the court held that filming of the plaintiff’s 
backyard for nearly two months constituted a search.178  The court reasoned 
that such a dragnet police practice is entirely dissimilar from a naked-eye 
observation or a single photograph taken by an officer.179 
Not all courts that have considered the mosaic theory have relied on it 
in their decisions.  Indeed, there are a handful of district court decisions that 
rely on the plain view and open fields doctrines to hold different forms of 
constant monitoring to not be searches.180  In United States v. Garcia-
Gonzalez, the court stated that it was persuaded by the approach and analysis 
of the mosaic theory; however, it was bound by First Circuit precedent laid 
out in United States v. Bucci.181  Essentially, that circuit applies the plain view 
doctrine to these types of situations.182  A similar reasoning was applied by 
the Eastern District of Tennessee in United States v. Houston.183  There, the 
court also relied on the fact that all of the areas that had been surveilled were 
exposed to the public.184  The open fields doctrine was referenced by the court 
for even more support.185  And not surprisingly, the court found that pole 
camera was not a search.186  But, interestingly enough, the court went on to 
hold that because the surveillance stretched to ten weeks, it violated the 
individual’s reasonable expectation of privacy.187  Thus, a constitutional 
search became an unreasonable one, breaching the protections of the Fourth 
 
177  Id. at 18 (“The permitted “plain view” observations in Ciraolo, however, are much 
different from law enforcement’s electronic, continuous remote surveillance here.”). 
178  896 F. Supp. 2d 915, 930 (D. Nev. 2012). 
179  Id. at 930–932; see also Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Suppress at 1–2, 12–
13, United States v. Vargas, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184672 (E.D. Wash. Dec. 15, 2014), ECF 
No. 106 (“This ‘view’ is so different in its intrusiveness that it does not qualify as a plain-view 
observation.”). 
180  See generally United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. CR 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 
5145537 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2015); United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Tenn. 
2013), objections overruled, No. CRIM.A. 3:13-10-DCR, 2013 WL 5936655 (E.D. Tenn. 
Nov. 1, 2013). 
181  United States v. Garcia-Gonzalez, No. CR 14-10296-LTS, 2015 WL 5145537, at *8–
9 (D. Mass. Sept. 1, 2015). 
182  582 F.3d 108, 116–17 (1st Cir. 2009) (“There are no fences, gates or shrubbery located 
in front of [Bucci’s residence] that obstruct the view of the driveway or the garage from the 
street. Both [are] plainly visible.  An individual does not have an expectation of privacy in 
items or places he exposes to the public.”) (internal quotations omitted).  
183  See generally United States v. Houston, 965 F. Supp. 2d 855 (E.D. Tenn. 2013), 
objections overruled, No. CRIM.A. 3:13-10-DCR, 2013 WL 5936655 (E.D. Tenn. Nov. 1, 
2013). 
184  Id. at 870. 
185  Id.  
186  Id. at 898. 
187  Id. 
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Amendment.188 
E. THE IMPORTANCE OF PERSISTENT AERIAL SURVEILLANCE DOES 
NOT CALL FOR WARRANTLESS SEARCHES IN BALTIMORE 
To be sure, this new technology presents practical, jurisdictional, and 
social advantages which make it an attractive investigative technique for 
police departments nationwide.  The technology is an asset in the fight 
against crime, and courts tend not to instruct the police on how to conduct 
their investigations. At least one court, however, has recognized that holding 
that persistent surveillance is a search would not start the judiciary down a  
slippery slope of superimposing its will on the executive.189 
Additionally, Professor Kerr has argued that it is too difficult for a 
district court to determine where to draw the line.190  Justice Alito struggled 
with this lack of a bright line in Jones.191  There, Justice Alito stated that four 
weeks was “surely” too long; however, he expressly refused to draw the 
line.192  But one district court has argued that courts are capable of making 
these determinations, and indeed, must do so.193 
The investigatory prowess of this technology cannot be denied.  It has 
an unlimited amount of ability and application, and it could certainly help 
with crime reduction.  In some cases, prolonged surveillance may be essential 
to the investigation.  As one court stated: “[l]onger surveillances may require 
more justification, and a case might be made that the government’s reasons 
underlying the need for tracking—in the case of domestic terrorism, for 
example—may call for less.”194  It goes without saying that persistent 
surveillance can be used to increase safety and sense of security. 
Not only in the United States, but around the world, law enforcement 
 
188  Id. It is worth noting that the court did go on to find that the good faith exception 
applied, and based on that, the evidence should not be excluded. Id. 
189  See United States v. Maynard, 615 F.3d 544, 565 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (“Regarding visual 
surveillance so prolonged it reveals information not exposed to the public, we note 
preliminarily that the Government points to not a single actual example of visual surveillance 
that will be affected by our holding the use of the GPS in this case was a search.”). 
190  See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 137, at 330–36.  
191  United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 430 (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). 
192  Id. (“We need not identify with precision the point at which the tracking of this vehicle 
became a search, for the line was surely crossed before the 4-week mark.”). 
193  United States v. White, 62 F. Supp. 3d 614, 623–24 (E.D. Mich. 2014) (likening “when 
the aggregation of data showing movement in public spaces crosses the line and becomes a 
‘search’” to “how long may law enforcement detain property waiting for a drug detection dog 
to arrive for a sniff before the intrusion matures into a ‘seizure’?”). 
194  Id. at 624. 
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agencies and officials argue that security cameras help investigate crime.195  
First, the evidence from a live recording is very reliable and leads to high 
conviction rates.196  Unlike humans, the footage does not lie.197  High-
resolution cameras present objective and indisputable evidence that can be 
used in a court of law.198  Second, the use of surveillance cameras may 
support deterrence, and has—in some cases—led to significant crime 
reduction.199  Not only are police capable of going back to the tapes and 
seeing who actually stole that watch, or vandalized that vehicle, but they can 
also intervene during the commission of a crime.200  Third, this technology 
can help not just in the fight against crime, but also in other public safety and 
security situations, such as traffic management and highway control.201  In 
fact, the state is given great deference when it comes to matters of national 
security and other issues arising under its general police power.202  In its 
review of police investigation specifically, the Supreme Court has often 
reiterated the deference it owes to law enforcement.203  These considerations 
would come into play if the Court, or any lower court, were to evaluate the 
government’s use of this technology. 
It is no answer that persistent aerial surveillance is not akin to—or as 
 
195  Max Guirguis, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 143, 144 (2004). 
196  Id. at 144–45. 
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198  Id. at 145. 
199  Id. at 147–48, n.1.  But see Rita F. Aronov, Privacy in A Public Setting: The 
Constitutionality of Street Surveillance, 22 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 769, 802 (2004) (citing to 
Christopher S. Milligan, Note, Facial Recognition Technology, Video Surveillance, and 
Privacy, 9 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 295, 298 (1999)); Christopher Slobogin, Public Privacy: 
Camera Surveillance of Public Places and the Right to Anonymity, 72 MISS. L. J. 213, 229–30 
(2002). 
200  See Guirguis, supra note 195, at 145. 
201  Max Guirguis, Electronic Visual Surveillance and the Reasonable Expectation of 
Privacy, 9 J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 143, 145–46 (2004). 
202   See Laura K. Donohue, Anglo-American Privacy and Surveillance, 96 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 1059, 1189 (2006) (“Mayor Daley boasted, ‘[t]his project is a central part of 
Chicago’s response to the threat of terrorism, as well as an effort to reduce the city’s crime 
rate.’”). 
203  See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996) (stating that “a reviewing court 
should take care . . . to give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by . . . local law 
enforcement officers . . . through the lens of his police experience and expertise.”); United 
States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (the Court has clarified that “a trained officer draws 
inferences and makes deductions . . . that might well elude an untrained person”); Brown v. 
Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 n.2 (1979) (reasoning that courts should defer to the “observations of 
a trained, experienced police officer who is able to perceive and articulate meaning in given 
conduct which would be wholly innocent to the untrained observer”); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 
1, 27 (1968) (explaining that courts should give “due weight . . . to the specific reasonable 
inferences which [an officer] is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience”). 
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severe as—other violations of fundamental rights.  Compare constant 
monitoring with free speech or bodily integrity: arguably, the technology 
does not have that chilling effect Justice Sotomayor warned of in Jones.  
Undeniably, location monitoring is different than speech, where an individual 
could be forced to suppress their conversations because of government 
action.  But this is a value judgment that society is tasked with making.  As 
pointed out above, a majority of the American public supports the use of 
cameras in public spaces.204  In Washington, D.C., residents of high crime 
neighborhoods have actually petitioned the government to install more 
cameras.205  In an increasingly globalized and dangerous world, it certainly 
seems like “many citizens have been willing to trade privacy for safety, and 
thus [do] not mind being watched.”206  Despite the willingness to forego their 
own privacy interests, consent is an independent and unique issue with 
regards to persistent surveillance.  And remember, the citizens of Baltimore 
were not informed of the deployment of this technology.207  It might be the 
case that the public is willing to approve of surveillance if they are on notice 
of themselves being monitored, as is the situation with street-level security 
cameras. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court would be correct in likening persistent aerial surveillance to 
GPS monitoring.  Furthermore, it would be appropriate to complete the 
carving out of the exception to the broad Knotts208 rule that they began in 
Jones:209 when traveling in public areas, an individual has an expectation of 
privacy in not being subjected to long-term surveillance.  As Justice Alito 
and Justice Sotomayor’s concurring opinions in Jones illustrate, five justices 
did conclude that there was an abuse of that expectation.210  A majority could 
be reinforced if the facts of the case did not include a physical trespass; 
persistent aerial surveillance does not.  Constant monitoring over an extended 
period of time reveals intimate details of habit, which, when viewed in the 
 
204  See supra notes 40–42.  Cf. Guirguis, supra note 195, at 146–147.  
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aggregate, exposes the privacies of life to the world.  The Fourth Amendment 
prohibits such a result.  Persistent aerial surveillance is a search.  And without 
a warrant and probable cause, it is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. 
 
